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Abstract—A system identification based approach to neural
network model replication is presented and the application of
model replication to verification of fundamental, single hidden
layer, neural network systems is demonstrated. The presented
approach serves as a means to partially address the problem of
verifying that a neural network implementation meets a provided
specification given only grey-box access to the implemented
network. The procedure developed involves stimulating a neural
network with a chosen signal, extracting a replicated model from
the response, and systematically checking that the replicated
model is output-equivalent to a specified model in order to
verify that the grey-box system under test is implemented to
specification without direct access to its hidden parameters. The
replication step is introduced to provide an inherent guarantee
that the stimulus signals employed yield sufficient test coverage.
This method is investigated as a neural network focused nonlinear
counterpart to the traditional verification of circuits through
system identification. A strategy for choosing the stimulus is
provided and an algorithm for verifying that the resulting
response is indicative of a specification-compliant neural network
system under test is derived. We find that the method can reliably
detect defects in small neural networks or in small sub-circuits
within larger neural networks.
Index Terms—Neural Networks, Replication, Verification, Sys-
tem Identification.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the design and test of control and signal processingsystems, methods whereby a system under test is stimulated
with a signal so that system performance parameters can be
inferred from the resulting response are of fundamental impor-
tance. For a linear system under test, such methods comprise
the cannon of linear system identification and provide a basis
for the comparison of control system performance [1]. For
nonlinear systems, choice of the stimulus signal and parameter
identification strategy often incur system specific challenges
to be addressed [2]. In this paper, we present a system
identification based strategy for determining the weights of
fundamental neural network systems and subsystems, and
apply the technique to verify that a small neural network or
small component of a larger neural network meets a given
specification.
Inspired by multi-sinusoidal system identification tech-
niques developed for electrical and electro-mechanical systems
[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8], the procedure involves stimulating a
suitably small neural network or a fundamental sub-circuit
inside a larger network with a sinusoid of a different frequency
at each input simultaneously. Then, following the methods
of model stealing / replication [9] [10] [11] [12] [13], a
replicated neural network is fit to match the measured response
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Fig. 1. Unit level test procedure applying network replication to verify
implemented neural network hardware or sub-circuits / sub-networks within a
neural network. An implemented network of known structure with unknown
weights is stimulated by sinusoids of different frequencies and the unknown
weights are identified from the response. The identified weights are checked
for equivalency to the specified weights to determine if the implemented
network is compliant.
for the given stimulus. Because the weights of a replicated
network are not guaranteed to match the original due to the
existence of symmetric configurations of the same weights
[14] [15] or output-equivalent networks with different weights
[16], we introduce a systematic method to check if the weights
of the replicated network represent a network with behavior
equivalent to the specification. The equivalency check accepts
the weights of two networks as inputs, and returns a measure
of similarity indicating if the two neural networks will have ap-
proximately equivalent output under certain assumptions. The
full test process employing the replication step is summarized
in Figure 1.
The model replication step is used to provide the test
engineer with a guarantee that the stimulus applied yields
suitable coverage to achieve a comprehensive test. If the signal
does not provide sufficient test coverage, the model replication
step will fail and the test will fail as a result. A failed test is
therefore indicative of (a) an insufficient test signal or (b) a
network defect. Introduction of this step biases the test towards
a low false negative rate of defect detection while offering
the test engineer high confidence in a passing result and the
opportunity to further inspect a failed result by switching to
a more comprehensive test signal. We offer this procedure
as a bridge between traditional system identification, network
replication, and the task of verifying that a network has been
implemented to meet a specification.
To frame an exemplary problem encountered by the artificial
intelligence practitioner and addressed by this work, we offer
for consideration a neural network that is to be used in the con-
trols or signal processing chain of a fielded hardware system.
Examples of fielded systems which may have neural controls
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2include unmanned aerial vehicles [17] [18] and hypersonic
vehicles [19]. Examples of neural network applications in
signal processing chains include signal amplification [20], mi-
crophone adaptation in automatic speech recognition systems
[21], and matched filtering [22] [23] [24]. We desire to verify
neural network sub-components or sub-circuits in these types
of systems using test signals similar to those that could be
used to test a nonlinear circuit.
In such applications, it is often advantageous for prac-
titioners to design a neural network in software and then
implement it in hardware, taking full advantage of both the
rapid development capabilities offered by open-source soft-
ware tools [25] [26] [27] and the run-time efficiency offered by
numerous proposed neural network hardware implementation
approaches [28] [29] [30] [31]. However, separating design
from implementation in this manner carries a need to answer
the question: how might a test procedure be designed to enable
a test engineer to verify that the neural network implemented
in hardware meets the specification provided by the original
designer?
The need for neural network verification has been recog-
nized for decades [32] and early work emphasizes the need
for system requirements and software testing [33] [34]. An
early reference on neural network verification and validation
is provided by Taylor [35]. In our work we apply the classical
definitions for verification (building the system right) and
validation (building the right system) from this text, and seek
to verify that the network was built right. While verification of
neural networks has since been researched in the context of de-
fense against adversarial attack [36] [37] and output reachable
set estimation [38], verification that a neural network meets a
provided specification remains an open need [39]. Addressing
the need is first complicated by the fact that multiple equivalent
symmetric configurations of specified network weights exist
[14] [15] and by the fact that small perturbations in parameters
can yield approximately equivalent input-output relationships
[16]. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the
test engineer may not have access to the proprietary data-set
used by the designer for training and testing.
One naive solution to these challenges would be for the
test procedure to mandate disassembling the network hardware
to check each weight individually. However, this would be
impractical for large networks and might not be possible for
networks implemented in embedded hardware. Furthermore,
even if the test engineer could extract each weight individually,
the weights implemented in hardware might not match the
specification exactly due to inevitable imprecisions. Due to
nonlinearity, changes in weights are not directly proportional
to the resulting changes in output. Thus, it is unclear what
degree of deviation represents a defect.
To address these challenges, we propose combining well-
known system identification techniques for nonlinear circuits
with recent neural network model replication techniques to
verify that a neural network or sub-circuit within a neural
network is implemented to specification in a manner analogous
to the way a traditional circuit would be verified: apply a
stimulus, measure the response, extract a model, check if
the extracted model meets the specification. This approach
Use Case for a Network Unit Test
Example	Neural	System	Integration	Process
Software Design
Database
Training Neural
Network
Network
Weights
Specified
Network
Hardware Dev.
Resolving
Defects
Developing
Hardware
Implemented
Network
Unit Test
Test
Procedure
Compliant?
No
Yes
Integration
Implemented
System
Hardware
Integration
To
System
Testing
Fig. 2. Example use case of a test for network specification compliance show-
ing how unit level compliance testing fits into a larger system development
process before integration and system level testing. A software design firm
trains a network on a proprietary data set and then provides a specification to
a hardware manufacturing firm to implement the network. The software firm
then provides the specification to a third party tester who must check that the
implemented network is compliant with the specification before allowing a
systems integrator to integrate the network with a larger system.
eliminates the need to test weights individually. Instead, small
neural networks can be tested holistically as grey-boxes and
large neural networks can be tested as collections of individual
sub-circuits such as those identified in recent work [40] [41]
[42] [43]. The full procedure therefore enables artificial intel-
ligence practitioners to design a neural network in software,
specify its weights and architecture for implementation in
hardware, and provide both the hardware and specification
to a third party to test for compliance. The ability to do so
with grey-box access and without sharing a common data-set
could enable effective cross-organizational collaboration and
third party testing without sharing proprietary data-sets. An
example system integration process that could make use of
these methods is shown in Figure 2.
A. Definitions
We define the specified network to be the neural network,
or a sub-circuit thereof, that was specified by the designer,
such as a software engineer who executed the original learning
process from a proprietary data-set that may not be provided to
the test engineer. Similarly, we define the network under test
to be the implemented neural network (e.g. in hardware), or
a sub-circuit thereof, which a test engineer must verify meets
the designer’s specification. The stimulus signal is the signal
applied by the test engineer and the response signal is the
signal measured by the test engineer, including measurement
noise.
The replicated network is defined to be the neural network
having weights extracted from the network under test by the
test engineer, or a sub-circuit thereof. A network under test is
verified to be a compliant network if the replicated network
is output-equivalent to the specified network and is called
a defective network otherwise. Two networks are determined
to be output-equivalent if it is shown that they will produce
3sufficiently close outputs for all inputs in a given interval,
according to a provided error metric. We define verification
to mean the process by which a test engineer confirms that a
network under test is compliant with the designer’s provided
specification.
B. Assumptions
To facilitate rigorous analysis of small fundamental neural
network circuits, several simplifying assumptions were made.
The relaxation of these assumptions will be a direction for
future work.
1) Multi-layered perceptron (MLP) architecture: In order
to clarify the exposition, a fundamental, single hidden
layer, single output neural network (i.e. MLP) is cho-
sen as the subject of this study. A hyperbolic tangent
activation and fully connected layers are assumed.
2) Bounded inputs: We assume that the test engineer knows
the largest possible magnitudes of all network inputs
(e.g. the test engineer knows how the input was nor-
malized). Without loss of generality, we use inputs xi
normalized such that xi ∈ [−1, 1].
3) Bounded weights: In order to provide a rigorous guar-
antee that a replicated network is output-equivalent to a
specified network, we also assume that the test engineer
knows the largest possible magnitude that a first layer
network weight can have. This value can be provided by
the design engineer in the specification. We note that an
incorrectly provided weight bound will be immediately
apparent to the test engineer because resultant calcula-
tions will clearly diverge.
4) Low-dimensional inputs: In order to allow visualizing
the inputs of the network and the classification bound-
ary, a two input network is used to generate figures.
Formulas are provided for n-dimensional inputs. The
issue of increasing computational complexity with input
dimensionality is discussed and potential solutions are
proposed.
5) Grey-box access: It is assumed that the engineer execut-
ing the model replication and verification procedures has
grey-box access to the neural network under test. Grey-
box access is taken to mean that the test engineer knows
the expected architecture of the network under test,
including the number of hidden neurons, but does not
have direct access to the weights and their configuration.
C. Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
• A system identification based approach to neural network
model replication is presented, including a strategy for
choosing stimulus signals and a means of deducing
expected characteristics of the resulting response signals.
• An equivalency test procedure for checking that a repli-
cated network is output-equivalent to a specified network
is derived and offered as a means of verifying that a
network under test is compliant with a specification. The
equivalency test operates directly on the weights of two
networks, computing its similarity metric directly from
the weights identified for the network under test and the
specified weights.
• A means of expanding a hyperbolic tangent activated neu-
ral network as a multivariate polynomial is provided as a
fundamental enabling technique for system identification
based model replication and equivalency checking, and
for analysis of neural network sub-circuits.
The rest of this paper is organized into an overview of
the method, a derivation of an enabling polynomial expansion
for the approach, an exposition of the model replication and
verification technique, a summary of experimental results, and
a discussion of related work, extensions, and limitations.
II. PROPOSED METHOD OVERVIEW
Consider a multi-layer perceptron neural network having
number of inputs NI and number of hidden neurons NH . The
network’s input layer weights and biases are denoted W {0} =[
w
{0}
n,i
]
∈ MNH×NI and b{0} = [bn] ∈ MNH×1. Its hidden
layer weights and bias are denoted w{1} =
[
w
{1}
n
]
∈M1×NH
and b{1} ∈ M1×1. The network has the activation function
ϕ(v) = tanh(v). The weights and biases for a given network
are collectively denoted β.
β =
{
W {0}, w{1}, b{0}, b{1}
}
(1)
Such a network has has the input-output relationship:
y (β, x) = w{1} tanh
(
W {0}x+ b{0}
)
+ b{1} (2)
The input to hidden neuron n is denoted vn:
vn = b
{0}
n +
NI∑
i=1
w
{0}
n,i xi ∀ n ∈ [1, NH ] (3)
The proposed method begins with a hardware network under
test having implemented weights and biases βI . The test
engineer needs to verify that implemented weights βI are
compliant with specified network weights βS . This might take
place during the unit test step in the example neural network
system integration process shown in Figure 2.
A. Stimulus and Response
The test engineer activates an interrogation signal xI to set
each input of the implemented neural network to a sinusoid
of a different frequency:
xI =

sin(ω1t)
sin(ω2t)
...
sin(ωNI t)
 (4)
The measured output of the implemented network with any
incurred measurement noise N is collected and denoted:
yM = y (βI , xI) +N (5)
4B. Network Replication
The input and measurement output pairs (xI , yM ) are then
used to numerically solve for the replicated network weights
βR by solving:
βR = arg min
β
(
(yM − y (β, xI))2
)
(6)
The minimization is subject to the constraint that each
element of βR has a magnitude less than the maximum weight
in the specification, i.e. βi < max (βS) ∀ βi ∈ βR. This
constraint must be applied because the expansion used to
test the equivalency of the replicated neural network with the
specified neural network is valid only for a given range of
hidden neuron inputs.
C. Equivalency Check
To assess if βR produces a neural network output-equivalent
to βS we apply a polynomial expansion to the hyperbolic
tangent activation function.
tanh (v) '
M∑
m=1
α2m−1v2m−1 (7)
The expansion is derived in the following section and
enables the specified and replicated neural networks to be
represented as multivariate polynomials having coefficients
Ψ(βS) =
(
Ψ1(βS) Ψ2(βS) · · · ΨN (βS)
)
and Ψ(βR) =(
Ψ1(βR) Ψ2(βR) · · · ΨN (βR)
)
respectively. To check
equivalency, we use an inverse hyperbolic sine scaled mean
difference between the coefficients:
E(Ψ(βR),Ψ(βS)) =
mean
(∣∣∣∣asinh(Ψ(βS)2
)
− asinh
(
Ψ(βR)
2
)∣∣∣∣) (8)
The error metric of equation 8 was judiciously chosen to
account for the large variability in the size of the coeffi-
cients. Larger numerical errors are less significant for large
coefficients than they would be for smaller coefficients. If all
coefficients were positive, a standard logarithmic error metric
could be employed to compress the error signals. Since the
coefficients are signed, we instead apply inverse hyperbolic
sine scaling to achieve similar compression without yielding
undefined errors for negative coefficients.
If E(Ψ(βR),Ψ(βS)) < ε, where ε is a specified tolerance,
then the network under test is declared compliant. Otherwise,
the network under test is declared defective. Figure 1 shows
the stimulus/response, replication, and verification (unit test)
steps. The polynomial expansion, stimulus/response signals,
and verification methods are elaborated on in the following
sections.
III. A MODIFIED POLYNOMIAL EXPANSION
To facilitate understanding of the expected characteristics
of a network under test’s response to a given stimulus, and
to facilitate the expansion to be used in the equivalency test,
we require a polynomial expansion in the form of equation
7. The Taylor series of equation 9 is of a suitable form but
converges only for arguments |v| < pi2 and therefore hinders
practical analysis of networks where activation function inputs
take larger values, i.e. W {0}I x+ b
{0}
I ≥ pi2 .
tanh (v) '
M∑
m=1
22m
(
22m − 1)B2m
(2m)!
v2m−1, |v| < pi
2
(9)
To address this need, we introduce an expansion which can
be made valid on a chosen interval (−vMAX , vMAX) by using
coefficients αj(M) adjusted to account for the number of
terms M in the expansion. The expansion is developed by
applying Fourier inversion to express the hyperbolic tangent
in terms of its own Fourier sine transform:
tanh(v) = lim
ρ→∞
∫ ρ
0
csch
(pi
2
ξ
)
sin(ξv) dξ (10)
To achieve a polynomial expansion, the kernel sin(ξv)
is expanded to a partial sum via Taylor series. To avoid
integrating into the divergent region of the expansion, the
upper bound of the integral is replaced with an upper bound
ρv(M) adjusted for (1) the number of terms M used in the
expansion and (2) the maximum anticipated value of v, vMAX .
tanh(v) '
M∑
m=1
∫ ρv(M)
0
ξ2m−1 csch
(pi
2
ξ
)
dξ
(−1)m−1v2m−1
(2m− 1)!
(11)
We define the range of validity of the M term partial sum
of sin(u) to be equal to ρ(M) where ρ(M) is the largest real
part of its complex roots.
ρ(M) = max(<{rM}) (12)
In equation 12, rM is the collection of complex roots of the
M term partial sum of sin(u):
rM = u ∈ C s.t.
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1u2m−1
(2m− 1)! = 0 (13)
Since the argument to the sinusoid in equation 11 is u =
ξv, the integration bounds can be adjusted for the maximum
argument of the hyperbolic tangent, vMAX , by noting that u =
ρ(M) implies ξ = ρ(M)v . To err on the side of conservatism,
we adjust ρ by the maximum of v.
ρv(M) =
ρ(M)
vMAX
(14)
An expansion of the hyperbolic tangent valid on the desired
interval (−vMAX , vMAX) can then be defined by rearranging
equation 11 and solving the integral.
tanh(v) '
M∑
m=1
αj (M) v
j , j = 2m− 1 (15)
αj(M) =
(−1)m−1
j!
(
Λj(ρv(M))− lim
→0
Λj()
)
(16)
5Λj(ξ) =
∫
ξj csch(aξ) dξ =
j+1∑
k=1
j!ξj−k+1
ak(j − k + 1)!
(
Lik(−eaξ)− Lik(eaξ)
) (17)
In equation 17 the parameter a is set to pi2 . The range
of validity ρ(M) in equation 12 and the anti-derivatives of
equation 17 can be precomputed and saved along with the α
coefficients of equation 15. We call the expansion of equations
15 – 17 a modified expansion of the hyperbolic tangent. These
coefficients can then be used to expand the network under test
as a multivariate polynomial. To perform this expansion, we
substitute the hidden neuron input as defined in equation 3
into equation 15.
tanh(vn) '
M∑
m=1
αj
(
b{0}n +
NI∑
i=1
w
{0}
n,i xi
)j
, j = 2m− 1
(18)
Applying multinomial expansion:
tanh(vn) '
M∑
m=1
∑
|κ|=j
αj
(
j
κ
)
ϑκnx
κ (19)
ϑn =
(
b
{0}
n w
{0}
n,1 · · · w{0}n,NI
)
(20)
Here κ =
(
κ1, κ2, · · · , κNI+1
)
is a multi-index where
uκ =
∏
i u
κi
i , |κ| =
∑
i κi, and
(
j
κ
)
= j!κ1!κ2!···κN ! is a
multinomial coefficient. The output of the network can then
be approximated by taking the output weighted sum of the
neuron outputs:
y(β, x) '
b{1} +
NH∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
∑
|κ|=j
αj(M)
(
j
κ
)
w{1}n ϑ
κxκ
(21)
We use Ψκ(β) to denote the coefficient associated with the
term xκ = xκ1xκ2 · · ·xκNI+1 in the polynomial approximation
of y(β, x). By definition of Ψκ(β) we can write:
y(β, x) '
∑
κ
Ψκ(β)x
κ (22)
We use Ψ(β) to denote the collection of all Ψκ(β) coef-
ficients. The algorithm of Figure 3 can be used to generate
Ψ(β) given the activation function expansion constants α and
the collection of weights β.
IV. NETWORK REPLICATION AND VERIFICATION DETAILS
The network replication procedure begins with the appli-
cation of a stimulus signal vector of the form of equation 4
to the inputs of the network under test having implemented
weights βI . Sinusoidal stimulus signals are used to ensure the
response signal is periodic and thus easy to measure in its
entirety. Since the response signal as given in equation 21 is
Algorithm for Generating the Ψκ(β) Coefficients
Input: α, β
Output: Ψ
1: Initialize new map Ψ : tuple→ double
2: for n = 1 · · ·NH do
3: ϑn ←
(
b
{0}
n w
{0}
n,1 · · · w{0}n,NI
)
4: for m = 1 · · ·M do
5: j ← 2m− 1
6: K ← all multi-indices κ s.t. ∑NI+1i=1 κi = j
7: for κ ∈ K do
8: if (Ψκ is set) then
9: Ψκ ← Ψκ + αj(M)
(
j
κ
)
w
{1}
n ϑκn
10: else
11: Ψκ ← αj(M)
(
j
κ
)
w
{1}
n ϑκn
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
16: return Ψ
Fig. 3. Algorithm for generating Ψκ(β) coefficients. The inputs of the
algorithm are the activation function expansion constants α and the collection
of network weights and biases β. The output is a hashmap data structure
mapping multi-indices κ (represented as tuples) to their corresponding Ψκ(β)
coefficient. For each power in the expansion of the activation of each hidden
neuron, the corresponding set of multi-indices are generated to expand the sum
in equation 21. If the Ψ coefficient for the current multi-index has already been
generated the result of the computation for the current multi-index is added
to the existing value such that the resulting map can be used to evaluate the
sum of equation 22.
a weighted sum of the multiples of the components of the
stimulus signal vector, it can be inferred that the fundamental
period of the response signal can be computed as the least
common multiple of the periods of the individual stimulus
signals. Measuring the response for the duration of at least one
fundamental period guarantees the full capture of the response
signal.
Of the individual frequencies selected for the components of
the test signal vector, we desire a combination that provides (1)
good coverage of the network’s output surface and (2) yields a
response signal with a short fundamental period thus resulting
in a quick but comprehensive capture of the network under
test’s output surface. We use Shannon entropy as a measure
of the coverage provided by a stimulus signal. We compute
the Shannon entropy of a given stimulus signal by considering
the signal sampled in discrete time well above the Nyquist
rate, and then treating each combination of discrete values as
a symbol ςi. As such, the entropy H of the stimulus signal
x is given H(x) = −∑i P (ςi) logP (ςi). As is well known
in the analysis of nonlinear circuits [3], stimulus signals with
components having frequencies that are integer multiples of
other components do not provide sufficient coverage to serve
as test signals.
An example signal that provides good entropy without
6yielding a large fundamental period is:
x =
(
sin(5t)
sin(4t)
)
(23)
An example signal that provides better entropy at the cost
of a larger fundamental period is:
x =
(
sin(11t)
sin(10t)
)
(24)
Our observations of the reliability of the verification pro-
cedure are shown with respect to stimulus signal choice in
Figure 8.
Once the response to the stimulus signal is measured, we
need to solve for the weights βR of a replicated network
having empirically output-equivalent performance to the im-
plemented network, since we do not have direct access to
the weights βI of the implemented network. This is achieved
through numerically solving equation 6 subject to the con-
straints listed in section II-B. We apply a trust region reflective
algorithm, however other constrained nonlinear optimization
techniques could be substituted to identify βR.
With the weights βR of the replicated network identified,
we need to determine if the replicated network is output-
equivalent to the specified network βS in order to make
the final assessment about whether the network under test
is compliant with the specification. To make this assessment
without yielding false failures due to equivalent configurations
of the same network or innocuous perturbations of the weights,
we compare the Ψ coefficients of each network Ψ(βS) and
Ψ(βR) instead of comparing the weights directly. We compute
these coefficients according to the algorithm of Figure 3.
Applying the error metric of equation 8, we determine if the
error between Ψ(βS) and Ψ(βR) is greater than an acceptable
tolerance ε. Based on our observations in tuning ε shown in
Figure 12, we choose ε = 1 as our tolerance to use in the
collection of experimental results.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
To collect experimental results, we begin by demonstrating
the accuracy of the modified expansion method employed
to derive the equivalency test, and then move on to assess
the validity of the equivalency test using a set of illustrative
experimental configurations. We then computationally model
the process of stimulating the network under test, collecting
the responses with measurement noise (modeled as white
Gaussian), identifying a replicated network, and checking the
replicated network for compliance. We determine the optimal
error threshold ε by varying ε for a population of 150 defective
and 150 compliant networks and recording the true and false
positive rates of defect detection (Figure 1) with respect to ε.
We then instantiate a group of 100 networks and introduce
defects into 50 of them. We run the procedure of Figure 1
on each network and track how many of the defects were
identified. We repeat the process with increasing amounts of
measurement noise and observe effects on defect identification
statistics.
Hyperbolic Tangent Approximation
Fig. 4. The results of a modified expansion of the hyperbolic tangent are
shown. The modified expansion provides a vMAX parameter which can be
increased to extend its region of convergence outside the region of converge
of the straightforward Taylor series. The plots above show the results of the
expansion for vMAX = 2 and vMAX = 5, along with the error between
each expansion and the true hyperbolic tangent. Sums were evaluated using
M = 40.
B. Hyperbolic Tangent Expansion Technique
The methods of this paper are enabled by a modified polyno-
mial expansion of the hyperbolic tangent, defined in equations
15–17, which we apply to achieve a polynomial expansion of
a small neural network or sub-circuit within a neural network.
The modified expansion provides a user-adjustable region of
convergence which can be made to extend outside the region
of convergence of the Taylor series. Here we present results
showing the accuracy of the expansion itself within its region
of convergence. The region of convergence can be extended
by increasing the vMAX parameter. In Figure 4, we show plots
of the evaluated expansion y˜(v) =
∑M
m=1 α2m−1v
2m−1 and
the error |y˜(v)− tanh(v)| between the expansion and the true
hyperbolic tangent for vMAX = 2 and vMAX = 5. In both
cases, M = 40 is used to evaluate the sum. In Figure 5, the
error between the expansion and the true hyperbolic tangent
is shown, for vMAX = 2 and vMAX = 5, with respect to the
argument of the hyperbolic tangent v and the number of terms
applied in the expansion.
7Hyperbolic Tangent Approximation Convergence
Fig. 5. The error between the modified expansion of the hyperbolic tangent
and the true hyperbolic tangent is shown with respect to the argument v
and the number of terms used in the expansion. Even powered terms which
are always zero in the expansion of the hyperbolic tangent are counted in
the number of terms, so 80 terms equates to M = 40. The expansion with
vMAX = 5 has a wider region of convergence but requires more terms to
reach an error as small as the expansion having vMAX = 2. Both expansions
diverge rapidly outside their region of convergence.
Stimulus and Response Signals
Fig. 6. An example stimulus signal and its resulting response signal are
shown. The stimulus signal has two components: x1(t) = sin(5t) and
x2(t) = sin(4t). The resulting response shown is the output of a random
network under test under application of this stimulus signal.
C. Stimulus and Response Signals
The example stimulus signal x of equation 23 is shown
in Figure 6 along with the resulting response y(β, x) for a
randomly selected small network under test with two inputs,
three hidden neurons, and a single output. The same stimulus
signal’s coverage of the circuit’s output contours is shown in
Figure 7. The output of same small neural circuit is shown
with respect to its input components x1 and x2. The path that
the stimulus signal takes across the output contours is shown.
To asses the effect of stimulus choice on the accuracy of the
verification procedure, we execute the verification procedure
of Figure 1 over a population of 100 networks, where 50 have
randomly introduced defects. Each network represents a small
neural circuit having two inputs, three hidden neurons, and
one output. We repeat the verification procedure using stimulus
Stimulus Signal and Network Output Contours
Fig. 7. The path that an example stimulus signal follows over the contours
of a random network under test is shown as a black line. The output of the
network over any (x1, x2) pair is shown as a contoured surface. The stimulus
signal has two components: x1(t) = sin(5t) and x2(t) = sin(4t).
Effect of Stimulus Signal Choice on Accuracy of Defect
Detection Procedure
Fig. 8. Defect detection accuracy is shown for several stimulus signals.
Accuracy statistics were computed over a population of 50 defective networks
and 50 compliant networks. The verification procedure was run on each
network with a measurement SNR of 100 dB, and the experiment was repeated
using several stimulus signals 10 rounds each using different random noise
each round. Stimulus signal entropy H is shown along with the frequency
ratio of the stimulus signal components ω1
ω2
. We observe that non-integer
ratios between ω1 and ω2 provide higher entropy and a more reliable test.
signals having several (ω1, ω2) pairs and observe how many of
the defects are correctly identified to compute the accuracy of
the procedure for each stimulus signal. The entire experiment
was repeated 10 times using different random measurement
noise and introducing new random defects each round. In this
experiment, defects are created by introducing random changes
to the weights of the network under test. We observe that
non-integer ratios between selected stimulus signal frequencies
provide higher signal entropy and that higher entropy stimulus
signals result in more reliable detection of the defective
networks.
8D. Testing the Equivalency Test
To determine if checking the error between the Ψ coeffi-
cients using the error metric of equation 8 is a valid means to
assess the equivalency of different sets of specified and repli-
cated network weights, we conduct four experiments, where
different kinds of equivalent and non-equivalent networks are
compared:
1) In an exactly equivalent networks experiment we instan-
tiate two copies of the same network and demonstrate
that the error metric E(Ψ(β1),Ψ(β2)) of equation 8 is
zero for β1 = β2.
2) In a symmetrically equivalent networks experiment we
instantiate two networks with weights rearranged in
obviously symmetric configurations such as those dis-
cussed by Sussmann [14] and Albertini [15]. We demon-
strate that the error metric E is still zero for these
symmetric configurations.
3) In a approximately equivalent networks experiment we
instantiate two copies of the same network and introduce
in one network a small perturbation in the hidden layer
weights (i.e. after the nonlinear activation) to cause a
proportionally small change in the input-output relation-
ship. We demonstrate that in this case E is non-zero but
still small, as is desired behavior.
4) In a nonequivalent networks experiment we instantiate
two completely different networks and demonstrate that
E is large, as is desired behavior.
In each experiment, a two input, three hidden neuron,
single output circuit with random weights is used as a test
case. The circuit is duplicated and the duplicate modified
in a manner that will result in either an equivalent or non-
equivalent circuit. We expect to observe a larger error metric
for non-equivalent circuits than for equivalent circuits. We
observe E = 0 in the exactly equivalent networks test. The
results of the symmetrically equivalent networks test, the
approximately equivalent networks test, and the non-equivalent
networks test are shown in Figures 9, 10, 11 respectively. In
the symmetrically equivalent networks test, we observe E = 0.
In the approximately equivalent networks test, we observe
0 < E < 1. In the non-equivalent networks test, we observe
E > 1.
E. Verifying a Population of Networks Under Test
To confirm that E < ε, ε = 1 is a valid condition for
determining equivalent networks, we perform a test where the
error threshold is swept and the accuracy of the procedure
of Figure 1 is recorded with respect to the threshold. A
population of 300 small neural circuits is instantiated, each
having two inputs, three hidden neurons, and one output. These
networks under test could represent a small standalone non-
linear circuit or small components of a larger neural network
being analyzed. We select 150 of the 300 small networks
under test and introduce defects into them by adding random
perturbations to the existing weights. The correct weights are
saved off as the specified network weights. We run the defect
detection procedure using different error tolerances spanning
from ε = 10−6 to ε = 102 and track the true positive and false
Symmetrically Equivalent Networks Comparison
Fig. 9. Output contours over a 2D input space are shown for two symmet-
rically equivalent neural networks. The symmetrically equivalent networks
were generated by creating two exactly equivalent networks and exchanging
neurons in one of the networks to create a network with the same behavior as
the first but with a different configuration of the same weights. The Ψκ(β1)
and Ψκ(β2) coefficients match exactly as is expected behavior.
Approximately Equivalent Networks Comparison
Fig. 10. Output contours over a 2D input space are shown for two
approximately equivalent neural networks. The approximately equivalent
networks were generated by creating two exactly equivalent networks and
introducing into one of the networks a small error that does not noticeably
affect performance and thus does not represent a defect. The Ψκ(β1) and
Ψκ(β2) coefficients match closely as is expected, yielding an error metric
E(Ψ(β1),Ψ(β2)) < 1.0.
positive rates of the test, where a true positive is a correctly
identified defect and a false positive is an incorrectly identified
defect. The error tolerance sweep is repeated with signal to
measurement noise ratios of 25dB, 50dB, and 100dB.
We find that ε = 1 provides a suitable balance between low
false positive rates and high true positive rates. False and true
positive rates are shown in Figure 12. We observe that false
9Non-Equivalent Networks Comparison
Fig. 11. Output contours over a 2D input space are shown for two non-
equivalent neural networks. The two non-equivalent networks were generated
by randomly perturbing the weights of two exactly equivalent networks. The
Ψκ(β1) and Ψκ(β2) coefficients do not match and yield an error metric
E(Ψ(β1),Ψ(β2)) > 1.0 as is expected.
Defect Detection True and False Positive Rates with Respect
to Error Tolerance ε
Fig. 12. Receiver Operating Characteristic curves are shown for the verifi-
cation procedure. A population of 150 defective networks and 150 compliant
networks were used to generate the curves. The Ψκ(β) coefficients were
computed for all networks and the verification procedure was executed with
different defect tolerances ε. The entire experiment was repeated using
different signal to noise ratios.
positives are caused by the optimizer failing to replicate the
network under test in the time allowed (we limit the number of
function evaluations to 10K, and limit the number initial seeds
the solver is allowed to try to 20 to keep run times consistent).
A false positive could be rectified by allowing the optimizer
to run longer on potentially defective networks under test.
With a suitable tolerance for identification of non-equivalent
networks determined, we create a population of 100 networks,
where 50 are compliant with the corresponding specified
network and 50 have defects. We run the defect detection
Defect Detection Accuracy wrt. Signal to Noise Ratio
Fig. 13. Defect detection accuracy with respect to signal to measurement noise
ratio is shown. Accuracy statistics were computed over a population of 50
defective networks and 50 compliant networks. The verification procedure was
run on each network for each measurement SNR shown. The entire experiment
was repeated 10 times for each SNR with different random measurement noise
for a total of 23000 calls to the test procedure. Mean and median accuracy
are shown as black dots and black lines respectively.
procedure of Figure 1 on all 100 networks for measurement
signal to noise ratios between 0dB and 110dB and observe
the accuracy of the defect identification procedure. We repeat
the entire procedure 10 times with different random defects
and different random noise. Observed test procedure accuracy
with respect to measurement SNR is summarized in Figure
13.
VI. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
This work is intended to connect traditional system identi-
fication with neural network replication and neural system or
subsystem verification, and therefore builds off the methods
of linear and nonlinear system identification. These methods
are combined with neural network replication approaches to
address challenges in neural network verification. As such,
this work provides several paths to extensions and connects
to several areas of neural network research including network
replication attack and defense, network verification, equiva-
lency, and neural sub-circuit level interpret-ability.
A. Relationship to Replication Attacks and Defenses
Neural network replication as a form of model stealing
attack wherein a surrogate model is trained to have similar
classification performance as a target model is well explored
[9] [10] [11] [12] [13]. Here we build off the methods of
neural network replication, re-purposing the avatar model [11]
or knockoff net [13] approach for the white-hat application of
neural system or subsystem verification. To meet the specific
needs of the verification application, we have contributed a
model replication approach which (1) reproduces the net-
work’s output surface for inputs in the bounded range and
(2) yields test signal responses that take an expected form
(distorted sinusoids with known fundamental period), even for
a neural network with unknown weights.
As a direction for future work, we propose further experi-
mentation with the use of various model replication strategies
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as a form of verification, building off the fundamental concept
that introducing a replication step into the verification proce-
dure provides an inherent guarantee of test signal coverage,
since test signals with insufficient coverage will cause the
replication step to fail. Furthermore, defenses against repli-
cation attacks for neural systems deployed on neuromorphic
hardware are presented by Yang et al. [44] and a software
based defense against replication attacks for public prediction
interfaces is presented by Juuti et al. [45]. We propose that
with further work replication approaches for verification could
be combined with these approaches and with principles from
cyber-security to enable replication for the purposes of system
verification for authorized users while blocking replication for
unauthorized users.
B. Neural Network Verification Methodology
A recent review of the state of the art in neural network
verification and validation by Borg et al. highlights the need
for methods of defining a formal specification for a neural
network and for specifying test cases [39]. We offer our
approach as a means to partially address this need, comple-
mentary to existing approaches addressing other aspects of
the verification problem. Examples of recent work on neural
network verification focus on defense against and identification
of adversarial perturbations [36] [37], output reachable set
estimation [38], and computing upper bounds on error rates
under adversarial attack [46]. Liu et al. survey algorithms
for verifying deep neural networks and divide them into the
categories of reachability analysis, optimization to falsify an
assertion, and search to falsify an assertion [47]. Bunel et al.
present a unifying framework for the formal verification of
piecewise linear neural networks (e.g. ReLU based) [48].
Furthermore, fuzz testing has also been presented as a
means to address neural network verification challenges,
particularly for networks implemented in software. White-
box fuzz testing approaches with test coverage maximization
strategies are available and demonstrated in recent work [49]
[50] [51] [52]. These test strategies assume access to code and
could be applied during software test stages to complement
the methods presented here. As an extension to this paper
and to the body of neural network test literature, we propose
experimentation into the effectiveness of different test methods
when employed at various stages of the system integration
process of Figure 2, both as standalone tests and in connection
with other test methods. We also propose investigation into
the minimum stimulus signals required to guarantee successful
model replication for networks of varying sizes.
C. Equivalent Neural Networks
Methods of identifying equivalent neural networks given a
matrix of neuron outputs are available [53] [54] [55] [56]
and have recently been advanced by Kornblith et al. [57].
Methods to identify opportunities for compressing a neural
network [58] [59] and for perturbing parameters to identify
output-equivalent neural networks are also available [16]. We
offer as a complement to these works a method of checking
neural network equivalence (i.e. checking network under test
compliance) by operating on the specified network weights and
the replicated network weights without accessing the output
signals of individual neurons.
D. Neural Network Sub-circuits and Interpretability
It has been recognized for decades that biological systems
contain recurring fundamental circuit elements [60] and facili-
tate robust, invariant representations of objects [61]. However,
it has only recently been demonstrated that trained neural
networks contain interpretable cells or sub-circuits comprising
semantic functions and algorithms [40] [41] [42] [62] [43].
Building on feature visualization methods such as those from
Erhan et al. [63], Simonyan et al. [64], and Mordvintsev et
al. [65], a number of methods are now available to visualize
individual sub-circuits inside neural networks [66] [67] [68]
[69] [70]. We offer the analysis methods of this paper as
especially applicable to the detailed study of such small sub-
circuits within larger neural networks and as a link between
the study of traditional nonlinear circuits and these neural
sub-circuits. We propose that the methods of this paper could
be extended to provide a means of comparing neural circuits
with different activations by extending the methods of section
III, and could also be used in future work as a means of
proving that a neural circuit has embodied a particular known
mathematical function.
E. Limitations
The test procedure developed in this paper is intended to
be a applied to small fundamental systems, and as such,
mathematical rigor was prioritized over speed of test exe-
cution. The test procedure calls for expanding a replicated
network into a multivariate polynomial of Ψ coefficients using
a modified expansion of the activation function, and as such
has some limitations. The first limitation is that the input
signals to each neuron must fall within the expansion’s region
of convergence. As the number of input neurons increase the
size of the input signals to the activation functions increase.
This challenge would be impossible to overcome using an
unmodified expansion of the hyperbolic tangent, since the
region of convergence is limited. The modified expansion was
thus introduced to provide a user adjustable region of conver-
gence which mitigates this challenge but does not eliminate it
entirely. We propose to investigate how accurate the expansion
can be made for very large inputs in future work to enable the
relaxation of this limitation.
The second key limitation of expanding the activation
functions as polynomials is that the number of terms in the
expansion of the entire network grows rapidly with the number
of inputs and the number of terms used in the expansion. While
we intend for the method to initially be used to analyze small
neural circuits, we propose that the scalability of the method
can be improved by (1) dividing large networks into smaller
sub-circuits to be analyzed individually, (2) paralellization of
the algorithms used, and (3) non-exhaustive computation of
and checking of the Ψ coefficients. The extent to which these
such methods can improve scalability remains a direction for
experimentation and analysis.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a system identification based approach
to the replication of fundamental single hidden layer neural
networks. The replication approach is applied to the verifi-
cation of small neural networks or small sub-circuits within
larger neural networks. We demonstrate that it is possible to
confirm that a small grey-box network under test meets a given
specification in a manner analogous to the system identifica-
tion methods traditionally applied to nonlinear circuits: i.e.
by stimulating the network with a given signal, extracting
a replicated model from the response, and checking if the
replicated model conforms to the specification. The procedure
is enabled by an algorithm for checking the equivalency of
two networks employing a modified polynomial expansion of
the hyperbolic tangent.
Of the modified expansion, we conclude that the expressions
derived yield the coefficients of a polynomial expansion of the
hyperbolic tangent with an adjustable region of convergence
suitable for analyzing strongly nonlinear behavior. The region
of convergence can be extended outside that of the Taylor
series therefore enabling the analysis of large input signals.
Furthermore, we conclude that the modified expansion of the
hyperbolic tangent can be applied to algorithmically determine
a set of Ψ coefficients for a network under test which can
be used to compare the network to other networks (e.g. to a
specified network). The Ψ coefficients depend only on a set
of constants α derived from the activation function using the
modified expansion, and the weights β of the network under
test. An error metric is provided for determining if two sets
of Ψ coefficients represent two equivalent neural networks.
Of the application of network replication to verification, we
conclude that neural circuits can be analyzed in a manner
analogous to nonlinear electrical circuits and that for small
neural circuits, the ability to replicate a grey-box network and
confirm the replica’s equivalence to a specification represents
a reliable means of checking whether or not the network
under test conforms to the specification. We conclude that
the introduction of a replication step into the verification
procedure provides an inherent check for test coverage as
intended and note that this result is reflected in the fact that
low coverage test signals yield a test with high recall / low
precision, while high coverage test signals yield a sensitive
and precise test.
Our planned directions for future work include: (1) investi-
gation into the scalability of this method through both division
of large networks into sub-circuits and algorithmic improve-
ments such as paralellization and non-exhaustive checking of
the Ψ coefficients; and (2) extension of the Ψ coefficients
to other types of nonlinear activations to determine if Ψ
coefficients can be used as a feature space inside of which
non-homogeneous networks can be compared.
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